The first opinion polls of the year send a mighty wake-up call to the coalition government, but they are not the death knell some might think. Polls are always a snapshot in time, subject to particular influences at the time they were taken. A more accurate assessment emerges from the trends that they disclose over time, rather than the result of any one individual poll.
In
this regard, a rolling average of the polls shows that while an election held
today would be extremely close, the coalition government is still marginally
ahead of the Opposition bloc. However, that lead has been reducing steadily.
While for most of 2024 the difference between the two blocs did not move much
since the 2023 election, National’s support has fallen sharply since
September/October, with Labour’s increasing, although not as sharply.
Nevertheless,
the National-led coalition is more
precariously positioned at present than each of the last two Labour-led
governments were at similar stages in the previous two Parliaments. For
example, at the equivalent point in in 2019, the Labour-led coalition was
leading the centre right bloc by almost 12 percentage points. And at the same
point in the last Parliamentary term, in 2022, the Labour-led bloc still had a
substantial lead over National and its allies.
Much
can of course change between now and election day. By the start of 2019,
National was beginning to open a small lead over Labour, only to see that
completely obliterated by the onset of Covid19, and Labour’s historic election
landslide later that year. Similarly, in 2022 Labour’s comfortable lead over
National waned and fell away altogether during the year. Labour’s handling of
Covid19 was no longer an asset and was turning people off in droves, leading to
the government’s defeat in 2023.
Therefore,
it is far too soon to draw firm conclusions about the implications of the
parties’ current ratings for the 2026 election outcome. However, some general
observations can be made, based on the figures.
The
first is that unlike any other lead party of government under MMP, National has
no electoral fat to draw upon when times get tough. Its 38% party vote share at
the last election – far lower than the vote share of the Key and Ardern
governments when they were first elected – means it has no reservoir of support
to draw upon.
Its
current polling average of just under 33% of the party vote is at least ten
percentage points below what it should be for the party to be confident of
re-election in two years’ time. Of arguably more concern for the government is
that National does not yet appear to have a strategy for growing its vote share
to this extent.
At
the same time, the situation is not all that rosy for Labour. The polling
average shows its vote share has grown by only about three percentage points in
the last six months, leaving it still well below the level of support it would
need to lead a government after the next election.
Of
the minor parties, support for the Greens and ACT has been relatively stable
since the last election. Both are on average rating less than a percentage
point higher than at the election. Although one recent poll showed New Zealand
First’s support hovering around the 5% party vote threshold level, its support on
average has not moved from the 6.6% party vote level it recorded on election
day. Given New Zealand First’s historic propensity to perform far better at
election time than it ever does in opinion polls during a Parliamentary term, that
leaves it in a comfortable position at present.
Te Pāti Māori looks to have more than doubled its party
vote support since last year’s election – to around 5.4% according to the
latest polling averages. But it is unlikely to see this rise in support
translate into a significant increase in its number of seats at the next
election. This is because all its seats are electorate seats. If it holds all
these seats at the next election and wins around 5.4% of the party vote as
current polls suggest, it would still only be entitled to the six electorate
seats.
This creates a potential problem for Labour should it
be in a position to form a government after the next election. Most of the new
votes Te Pāti Māori could attract will likely have come from Labour, given
Māori voters’ historic links to the Labour Party, but the return in terms of
seats won for the centre left bloc may not be as great as it might be had those
voters stayed loyal to Labour.
A further complication for Labour is that Te Pāti Māori
is almost certain to make policy demands – like the establishment of an
independent Treaty of Waitangi Commissioner with the power to veto government
actions about the Treaty – that Labour will find difficult to accept in whole
or part, without risking alienating
conservative elements of its own core constituency. Hipkins’ vacillation on the
issue demonstrates Labour’s problem: it cannot afford to be too dismissive of Te
Pāti Māori’s demands because it is unlikely to be able to form a government
without them, but, if it is too agreeable, it risks not getting enough votes of
its own to be in a government-forming position.
While ACT and the Greens have uncompromisingly nailed
their colours to the National and Labour masts respectively, New Zealand First
has been somewhat more ambivalent about its options. At this stage, however,
there appears to still be too much bad blood between New Zealand First and
Labour, following the experience of the 2017-2020 coalition, to see a
Labour-led government involving New Zealand First as a viable option.
All this suggests that the next election is still the
National-led coalition’s to lose. However, more antics of the type seen from
David Seymour of late could hasten that process.