Being a backbench government Member of Parliament is at best a mixed blessing.

On the one hand, there is the excitement of being part of the government team, able to interact with Ministers from the Prime Minister downwards about what the government is doing and generally being “in the know”. Through Caucus committees, government backbenchers can work alongside Ministers on the development of policy ideas which may eventually come to fruition as government policy.

Government backbenchers can also lobby Ministers about issues of particular importance to the electorates or districts they represent and can generally expect, for obvious political reasons, any such representations to be treated more favourably than if they were coming from an Opposition MP. Locally, they can then claim the credit for moves beneficial to their electorates or regions.

But, on the other hand, the ultimate decisions still rest with Ministers and the Cabinet, meaning government backbenchers are often no more than influential supplicants. And because of collective Cabinet responsibility – the doctrine that binds all members of the Executive, including Ministers outside Cabinet and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries to support all Cabinet decisions – the Executive virtually always has the numbers to prevail in any Caucus discussion.

The formation of the Budget each year, and major policy decisions are almost entirely the province of the Cabinet, with backbenchers usually informed of the details after the event. In case of the Budget, government backbenchers are normally briefed on its contents only about an hour before it is delivered in the House – about the same time as senior Opposition MPs are given an embargoed copy in a pre-Budget lock-up, and considerably later than the media whose lock-up begins hours earlier – yet they are expected to support it enthusiastically when it is debated in the House.

It is often a similar process regarding controversial legislation pushed through under Urgency. In what has become the classic but no means only example, in late 1988 Labour MPs were informed at an early morning meeting of Cabinet’s intention to introduce at 9:00 am that morning under Urgency a Bill to make “some minor technical changes” to the way departmental chief executives were appointed – that Bill was the infamous State Sector Act.

Almost certainly, the same process would have been followed with this week’s dramatic and controversial changes to the way pay equity issues are addressed. The fact that this was an ACT-driven initiative adds a further complication to the process. But the surprise that accompanied its announcement suggested as few people as necessary were aware in advance of the plan for obvious security reasons. Government backbenchers were unlikely to have been in this group.

The upshot was that when Parliament resumed this week after a three week recess this legislation was introduced under Urgency, to be passed through all stages as soon as possible without any reference to a select committee or opportunity for public submissions. The Cabinet simply wanted the legislation passed as quickly as possible, to prevent the possibility of any legal or other challenges before the law was changed.  

To do so, it relied on the support of the government backbench for the obligatory occasional brief supportive speeches and the necessary votes in Parliament for it to happen as quickly as possible. As they did so, the backbenchers would have had to endure the usual standard cries of “shame” and outrage from the other side of the House, notwithstanding that they too when in office – like every government – used and will continue to use Urgency in this way to pass controversial legislation.

Over the next few weeks, it will be the government backbench “lobby fodder” that will have to do the lion’s share of facing up and responding to the anger of those adversely affected by this legislation. They will also be the ones challenged to explain why they supported it. Ministers, meanwhile, will have shifted their attention to the Budget due at the end of May. Between now and then, as is customary, there will be an ever-increasing drip-feed of announcements from Ministers about the good things they have secured in this Budget.

But for the government backbenchers, the same old grind will continue. Once they have weathered the storm over the pay equity legislation, they will need to gear up to support and explain the Budget in its entirety, despite having had a similarly minimal input into its development. And all the while they will be focused on convincing their constituents that they are personally having an impact on what the government is doing and are therefore worth re-electing next year.

For some, the motivation will be a noble belief that their government is always right. For others it will be a case of proving their loyalty to the team and willingness to take the good with the bad, in the hope that one day they will become Ministers. Then they really will be able to have a proactive and meaningful impact on what the government is doing.

 

There is an old saying doing the rounds in Rome at present as Cardinals gather to elect a successor to Pope Francis that "he who enters the conclave a Pope, leaves a Cardinal". While the warning has not always been borne out in recent Papal elections, it does have application more widely.

In the wake of this week’s announcements of Andrew Little’s candidacy for the Wellington Mayoralty and Mayor Tory Whanau’s subsequent withdrawal in his favour, there has been a general assumption that the Mayoralty is now Little’s for the taking, notwithstanding that there are other declared candidates in the race and still over five months until the election.

Nominations for election do not open until the start of July, with the final dates for candidates to declare themselves being August 1. There is still plenty of time therefore for other candidates to emerge or for the electoral scene to change to challenge the emerging sense that the Mayoral election will really be Little’s coronation.

Much of the early support for Little has been because he was seen as the best prospect to topple Whanau. Many moderate and centre-right voters were prepared to hold their noses and to support him on this basis. However, it is an open question whether they will continue to do so now that Whanau has withdrawn, or whether they will revert to form and look for a candidate more in tune with their outlook. If that is the case, the broad coalition predicted to build around Little could be over before it started.

There has been much talk that Little’s ability to work across party lines is just what the dysfunctional and divided Wellington City Council needs right now. But that capacity may be over-stated. Early in the term of the previous Labour/New Zealand First government there was a row over Labour’s intention to scrap the Three Strikes law ACT had promoted during the term of the National-led government.

As Minister of Justice, Little publicly announced Labour’s plans without first consulting New Zealand First (which supported Three Strikes), on the grounds that repealing the Three Strikes law was Labour policy and therefore no consultation was required. It was not a good indication that he could work collaboratively across party lines to achieve an agreed policy outcome.

Little has also been described as a safe pair of hands, just the sort of leader Wellington now needs to address its major problems, responsibly and credibly. But it is worth remembering that in Labour’s second term, Little, as Minister of Health, was the author of the 2021 health reforms which abolished district health boards in favour of a central agency, Te Whatu Ora (since renamed Health New Zealand) and Te Aka Whai Ora, the standalone Māori Health Authority which the National-led coalition abolished on returning to office. 

However, so far, his reforms have not improved the delivery of public health services. Since 2021, the public health service has been bedevilled by ongoing uncertainty about its form and structure; significant staffing shortages across health care professions with no clear plan for filling those gaps, and a continuation of chronic funding shortages.

These examples do not detract from Little’s credibility as a Mayoral candidate, but they do provide a more balanced perspective of his capabilities, in contrast to some of the more inflated claims others are making in support of his Mayoral bid.

As a seasoned politician, Little will understand full well that while his political record will attract scrutiny during the forthcoming Mayoral campaign, his election will depend more on the policy programme he puts forward, and whether that resonates with Wellington voters. He will know that the election is about voters making their choice, not giving him their anointment.

After the dramas of recent years, Wellingtonians want a Mayor and Council that will stick to their knitting and ensure that basic services are efficiently and properly provided. They want rates to be kept as low as possible; an end to social engineering projects like social housing, and vanity projects like cycleways and upgrading the Golden Mile.

Voters will be assessing all candidates on their willingness to make these things happen for the city. Their reputations and experience will be relevant to their capacity to do so.

Although at this stage, Little looks well-placed in this regard, his election should not be accepted as a foregone conclusion. His plans for the city still need to be outlined, then tested, defended and scrutinised alongside those of other candidates during the campaign. Only then will it become clear whether he is the best choice to lead Wellington.

Right now, the last thing Little wants is to enter the campaign looking like a Mayor but ending up a private citizen. It is a message some of his more enthusiastic media and other backers should take on board.