This week's attempted
National Party leadership coup quickly descended into disorganised farce. The
immediate casualty was not Christopher Luxon as his Caucus detractors may have
hoped, but Chris Penk. Despite his repeated denials and public pledges of loyalty
to Luxon, he was widely reported to be the stalking horse for at least one of
those wanting to depose the Prime Minister. However, he ended up not only failing
to achieve that goal but destroying his own promising political career in the
process.
One of the most basic
norms of Parliamentary politics is that everything is ultimately about the
numbers - the numbers to form a government, through to the numbers to topple a
leader. Without the numbers to do things, politicians are impotent and unable
to achieve anything, something Opposition parties face every mind-numbing day
they are out of power.
Yet that basic point
seems to have been either overlooked or not understood by those Caucus members wanting
to get rid of Luxon. Making the case against his continued leadership was one
thing, made easier by Luxon's recent gaffes, but organising the numbers to make
a change became a step too far. With up to four potential challengers, the odds
always had to be on Luxon coming through the middle and seeing them off.
His task would have been
far more difficult had his critics been able to look beyond their visceral
distaste for Luxon's style and agree on a single ticket to make the challenge.
The fact they could not says less about the respective abilities of the
potential challengers than it does about their competing and uncompromising
egos and ambitions, which does not bode well for future Caucus cohesion.
Only once before has National ousted a sitting Prime
Minister. In 1997 Dame Jenny Shipley oversaw a Caucus revolt against Jim Bolger
while he was overseas, but there were then still two years to run until the
1999 election, not just under three months as at present. The last time National
changed its leader this close to an election was in September 1957 when ailing
Prime Minister Sid Holland was persuaded reluctantly to stand down after eight
years in office to make way for Keith Holyoake (who lost the election three
months later).
Nevertheless, despite the unique nature of the current
circumstances, there are some wider political implications arising from
it.
The most significant relates to the increasing tendency to
look to “saviour” leaders to revive a party’s flagging fortunes and the
consequent attraction to non-career politicians to provide the answer. Dr Don
Brash, who became National’s leader in 2003 after less than two years in
Parliament was arguably the first of these. His backers believed that his
background as a respected Governor of the Reserve Bank would equip him to
provide prudent, “nonpolitician” leadership, but the experiment did not work.
Brash was toppled as National’s leader in 2006 and replaced
by Sir John Key. Key had been in Parliament for just four years, following a
successful international business career and became Prime Minister two years
later. He is the exception that proves the rule because he quickly realised the
difference between a successful external career and success in politics and
made the adjustment accordingly.
Christopher Luxon had a similarly successful international
business career and enjoyed an even more stellar rise than Key to become Prime
Minister after only three years as an MP. But unlike Key, he has seemed unable
and unwilling to leave his corporate background behind and transition into
being an effective national political leader. Luxon’s language and style always
come across as much more akin to that of a chief executive rather than a Prime
Minister and often therefore out-of-step with the average New Zealander.
Former Labour leader David Shearer, who was parachuted into
the Labour leadership in 2011 after two years as an MP, and following a
successful United Nations and diplomatic career, is another case in point. He
also failed to make the impact his supporters had hoped for and resigned the
leadership after just over eighteen months.
The point arising from each of these examples, which all
parties need to contemplate, is that “saviour” leaderships rarely succeed.
There is no real substitute for solid, political experience. Luxon’s frequent
excuse when confronted with situations that had challenged governments of
recent years that he “wasn’t around then” is inadequate and leaves him
increasingly looking out of his depth. Unlike Key, who went out of his way to
learn the reasons why previous decisions had been made, Luxon always seems not
all that interested.
For all that, National has now made the choice to persevere
with Luxon, at least until the election. But unlike the aftermath of April’s
confidence vote, which Luxon interpreted as an unqualified endorsement of his
leadership style requiring no change, there will have to be some changes if
Luxon’s professed determination to lead National to victory is to be achieved.
For a start, he needs to understand that MMP is about power
sharing between parties of like intent to make government work, not single
party domination the way it used to be. In that regard, and in the light of
recent polling, Luxon needs to revisit his foolish, precipitate ruling out of
the Opportunity Party as a potential post-election partner.
After all, the difference between success and impotence in
politics still comes down to getting the numbers.